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The Business Model of Social Banks 
 
Abstract 
Based on an extensive literature review, this paper proposes to define social banks (SBs) as 
social enterprises that run banking activities with the social mission of supplying credit to other 
social enterprises, which are typically less profitable than for-profit businesses. This definition 
marks our starting point for developing a theoretical framework to explain how SBs survive 
without subsidies in the banking market. We build on a two-pillar business model of value-
based financial intermediation, which comprises an ownership structure that limits residual 
ownership claims and preferential credit conditions associated with financial sacrifices from 
motivated depositors. We also clarify the link between SBs and stakeholder banks and weigh 
up the importance of market interest rates for facilitating the business of SBs. An empirical 
analysis based on panel regressions on 5,400 European banks over the 1998-2013 period attests 
to the relevance of our theoretical framework. It also confirms that a low interest rate 
environment raises concerns about the sustainability of the SB business model. 
  
1. Introduction 
Social orientation makes a significant difference in banking (Barigozzi & Tedeschi, 2015). 
Scholars nevertheless struggle to understand the business model of social banks (SBs). This 
paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by proposing a definition of social banking. We 
suggest defining SBs as social enterprises (SEs) that finance other SEs. Accordingly, SBs lie at 
the intersection of banks and SEs. In line with this definition, our contribution is twofold. First, 
we suggest a two-pillar business model of value-based financial intermediation. The proposed 
model combines funders’ financial sacrifices and favorable credit conditions for socially 
oriented borrowers. Second, we test our theoretical predictions on empirical data by exploiting 
a rich dataset on European banks.  
Social banking has developed rapidly worldwide over the last two decades (GABV, 
2012). Rough estimates indicate that, over the 1998-2013 period, the total assets of SBs grew 
twice as fast as those of other banks. Surprisingly then, there have been few studies carried out 
on SBs, and there is no universally accepted rigorous definition of social banking. Because 
Europe is the SB stronghold, research has focused mainly on social banking in the European 
context. Existing studies have uncovered some key features of SBs, which are often portrayed 
as double bottom line institutions, implying that profit-making is a way to achieve economic 
sustainability while adhering to social goals (Becchetti et al., 2011; Benedikter, 2011; San-Jose 
et al., 2011; Weber & Remer, 2011). SBs support their communities and the common good 
through simple, transparent, and prudent intermediation principles. The financial transactions 
of SBs focus on funding the real economy rather than trading in speculative markets. Attention 
turned to SBs in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial turmoil. Many regular banks were 
found to have been insufficiently capitalized and had to be bailed out by taxpayers after taking 
excessive risks, prompting a search for alternative business models. Scholars have contributed 
to this quest by investigating the crisis performance of stakeholder banks (Ferri et al., 2015), 
Islamic banks (Beck et al., 2013a; Gheeraert & Weill, 2015), community banks (Hudon & 
Meyer, 2016), and other religiously oriented financial institutions (Mersland et al., 2013).   
Our study extends the literature on alternative banking into the domain of social banking. 
The question underpinning this paper is: How can SBs survive without subsidies in the banking 
market? This question stems from the fact that SBs finance SEs, which are known to be less 
profitable than for-profit businesses. To resolve the apparent lack of understanding regarding 
SBs, this paper builds on a business model that comprises three groups of agents, namely 
owners, borrowers and depositors. The owner and depositor groups are the SB funders, 
motivated agents who are willing to accept a below-market return on their capital as long as the 
bank invests in social projects. The borrower group refers to the SEs that enjoy preferential 
credit conditions from the SBs (Borzaga & Defourny, 2001). We test the relevance of this 
theoretical construct by using sample matching and panel regressions on 5,400 European banks 
over the 1998-2013 period. The results confirm that SBs benefit from a lower cost of funding, 
from both owners and deposit holders, and that they charge borrowers below-market interest 
rates. Our findings are consistent with the idea of investors and depositors passing on their 
earnings to social borrowers at sub-market rates. In addition, we reveal that while SBs are 
different from conventional banks (CBs), they nevertheless share characteristics with 
stakeholder banks. Finally, we show that SBs counteract rising interest rates in order to keep 
offering affordable rates to SE borrowers and that their business model suffers when market 
interest rates go down because it is difficult to grant loans with preferential rates when market 
rates are close to zero.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our proposed definition of a SB. 
Section 3 develops our theoretical predictions. Section 4 introduces the database and describes 
the empirical design. Section 5 discusses the regression results. Section 6 checks their 
robustness. Section 7 concludes. 
2. What is a Social Bank? 
We define SBs as SEs that finance other SEs through banking activities. On the one hand, SBs 
are genuine banks, with the legal and practical implications this entails. From a legal 
perspective, this definitional feature excludes a number of social funding providers, including 
the many European microfinance institutions that are non-banking financial institutions 
(Cozarenco & Szafarz, 2019). SBs are subject to the same fiscal and regulatory frameworks as 
their same-jurisdiction counterparts. As with regular banks, SBs develop a credit activity that 
is known to suffer from informational asymmetry. In line with the theory of financial 
intermediation (Diamond, 1984; Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993), SBs are required to overcome 
this information asymmetry in order to channel capital from (social) investors to (social) 
borrowers efficiently. Typical devices facilitating this include screening, selection, and 
monitoring mechanisms. In sum, SBs can be viewed as banks that have a specific pool of 
borrowers. On the other hand, SBs are SEs, and SEs are endeavors set up in pursuit of the 
common good (Peredo & Chrisman, 2006). Profit maximization is not their primary objective—
although generating profit is not ruled out (Besley & Ghatak, 2017; Ghatak, 2019). They aim 
to internalize social costs and create positive externalities (Doherty et al., 2014). SEs can vary 
substantially in size, scale, and purpose due to the broad spectrum of products and services they 
supply (Borzaga & Defourny, 2001). They typically promote the inclusion of disadvantaged 
people through work, ethical trade, organic food, renewable energies, recycling, community 
services provision (e.g. health and education services), subsidized housing, and so on (Dart, 
2004; Di Domenico et al., 2010).  
The definition of a SE varies substantially from one side of the Atlantic to the other 
(Kerlin, 2006).1 In regard to the European context focused on in this study, the concept of SE 
first emerged in Italy with the introduction of social cooperatives in the 1990s. An authoritative 
and consensual formalization of the ‘ideal-type’ SE is provided by the EMES research network 
with its set of nine definitional characteristics, which are organized into two groups. The first 
group comprises four characteristics relating to the private-sector entrepreneurial nature of SEs: 
(i) continuous activity producing goods and/or services, (ii) large autonomy, (iii) significant 
risk level, (iv) minimum amount of paid work. The five characteristics in the second group 
encapsulate the social orientation of SEs: (v) explicit social mission, (vi) initiative from 
collective dynamics, (vii) democratic decision-making loosely related to ownership, (viii) 
stakeholder involvement, and (ix) limited profit distribution (Defourny & Nyssens, 2008 & 
2010).  
To justify defining SBs as SEs, we must explain how institutions that call themselves SBs 
meet these nine criteria. As banks, SBs possess the economic and entrepreneurial characteristics 
associated with SEs, that is they fulfill conditions (i) to (iv). SBs also fulfill criterion (v) because 
their explicit social mission is to fund other socially oriented organizations. This pivotal 
criterion marks the difference between cooperative/mutual organizations and social 
organizations. Finally, SBs fulfill criteria (vi) to (ix) because of their ownership and governance 
attributes. Profit is not their main objective but a means of achieving economic sustainability 
(Becchetti et al., 2011; Benedikter, 2011; Weber & Remer, 2011; Mykhayliv & Zauner, 2018). 
Many SBs operate with a stakeholder-ownership structure, either as a cooperative or as a 
savings bank. Shareholder-owned SBs use self-regulatory arrangements to constrain their 
                                                          
1 American SEs are hybrid organizations (Austin et al., 2006) that tend to disconnect their business activity from 
their social goal. By contrast, SEs in continental Europe are more inclusive. Perhaps for this reason, social 
entrepreneurship still lacks an established epistemology (Nicholls, 2010), and its legitimation refers to actors, 
discourses, and narrative logics (Mair et al., 2012). 
owners’ power. For example, the shareholders’ voting rights are capped at Alternative Bank 
Schweiz (ABS, Switzerland) and Triodos Bank (Netherlands and Belgium). Alternative forms 
of stakeholder involvement are also promoted, such as the participation of non-shareholders in 
governing and executive bodies (San Jose et al., 2011). In short, SBs are enterprises because 
they are banks, and they are social enterprises because they have a social mission. 
Defining SBs as SEs helps us to understand their raison d’être in the economy. By 
providing capital to SEs, SBs address a market gap because the regular credit market fails to 
meet SEs’ demand for credit. Although SEs’ activities cover a broad spectrum, their funding is 
plagued by two major issues.2 First, SEs cannot afford expensive credit. As double—or 
multiple—bottom line firms, SEs tend to create trade-offs between social mission and financial 
constraints (Wry & York, 2017; Wry & Zhao, 2018). Their businesses are typically less 
profitable than their for-profit counterparts (Defourny & Nyssens, 2008 & 2010). Second, in an 
asymmetric information context, the social orientation of SEs makes them even more opaque 
as borrowers than for-profit small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which are already known 
to be opaque (Berger & Udell, 2002). The business activities of SEs, such as supplying welfare-
related and environmental services and hiring disadvantaged workers, are unfamiliar to 
standard bankers (Defourny & Nyssens, 2008). Their financial sustainability depends on key 
features that are hard to quantify, such as relational capital, acquisition of non-market resources, 
and social value creation (Cornée, 2019). Regular banks are therefore ill-adapted to funding 
                                                          
2 To cope with the pervasive lack of funds, SEs may undertake financial ‘bricolage’, a term referring to the 
improvisation and ingenuity used in circumventing financial obstacles (Di Domenico et al., 2010; Halme et al., 
2012). SEs may also turn to crowdfunding opportunities and socially minded funders, such as impact investors 
(Lehner & Nicholls, 2014; Kickul & Lyons, 2015), who encourage social entrepreneurs to deliver observable 
social outcomes (Doherty et al., 2014). In addition, while the mutual funds driven by the principles of socially 
responsible investing claim to deliver both financial and social performances to investors (Barnett & Salomon, 
2012), a positive relationship between these performances raises doubts about the social accountability of the fund 
issuers (Laufer, 2003). 
 
SEs and unsurprisingly severely ration the funding they offer to this sector. This mismatch 
creates the opportunity that SBs seek to take advantage of.  
To sum up, the nature of social banking is closely intertwined with that of SEs. Unlike 
regular banks, SBs do not aim to maximize profit but to target financial sustainability, and 
unlike conventional stakeholder banks, they purse an explicit social mission. The reason for 
their existence is the unmet demand for credit from non-banking SEs. However, our definition 
of SBs does not take into account the business model that allows these banks to be sustainable 
in the credit market. The next section addresses this issue by building a theoretical framework 
that rationalizes the existence of SBs in a capitalistic banking market. 
3. Hypothesis Development 
Defining SBs as banks with a social mission has certain implications. This section theorizes the 
implications, which are grouped into three categories, pertaining to both financial sustainability 
and banking activities. Section 3.1 hypothesizes a business model whereby SBs survive through 
the financial sacrifices of their motivated stakeholders. This core business model comprises two 
pillars: benevolent ownership and specific intermediation mechanisms. Hypothetically, these 
two pillars enable SBs to address market failure by supplying affordable credit to SEs. This SB 
business model thus consists in channeling the charitable contributions of socially minded 
agents to borrowing SEs. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 describe our theoretical framework further by 
clarifying the link between SBs and stakeholder-based ownership and by examining the impact 
of market interest rates on the SBs’ intermediation scheme, respectively. The resulting set of 
hypotheses will be tested on the data in Section 5. 
  
3.1. The Core Business Model of Social Banks: The Two Pillars 
The first pillar relates to ownership. Criteria (vi) to (ix) of EMES’s definition of a SE state that 
ownership rights and profit distribution are limited, thereby implying that the owners of SEs 
are motivated by the social mission rather than by financial earnings. A direct implication for 
SBs is that their ownership is made up of motivated agents who consent to a financial outlay in 
order to serve the social mission of providing affordable credit to SEs. We therefore hypothesize 
that SBs collect capital at below-market conditions from motivated owners willing to support 
the development of SEs. Our first hypothesis states that the financial sacrifice of SB owners 
makes the return of SBs smaller than that of their CB counterparts. 
Hypothesis H1: The returns delivered by SBs to their owners are smaller than those 
provided by CBs: 
∆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆) < 0        (1) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥) represents the return to owners of bank x, where 𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆}. 
The second pillar concerns the intermediation design. Like other banks, SBs carry out 
delegated monitoring on behalf of their investors (Diamond, 1984). We contend that their 
distinctive feature lies in the role of values in the intermediation process. Under H1, SB owners 
make financial sacrifices with respect to the market return available to them from other same-
risk investment opportunities. However, benevolent or motivated ownership can be found in 
any industry, including banking. This next mechanism we propose relates specifically to the 
banking sector, and it revisits the intermediation model when exposed to social purpose, which 
is rather unusual. We consider the two sides of socially minded intermediation. 
SBs explicitly claim to finance SEs by establishing strong lending relationships and 
charging below-market interest rates. To address the severe information asymmetry in SE 
financing, SBs draw on their experience in screening and monitoring social projects. Their 
hands-on experience stems from the social ties and human connections they have established 
with the social entrepreneurship milieu. This embeddedness is key to negotiating financial deals 
in informational environments where hard information3 is insufficient to assess credit risk 
confidently (Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003; Duffner et al., 2009). In keeping with their mission and 
supported by micro evidence, SBs are able to offer more favorable credit conditions to their 
borrowers than CBs. In a lab setting, Cornée et al. (2012) show that social bankers charge a 
lower interest rate than commercial bankers. Using institution-specific data, Cornée and Szafarz 
(2014) find that the borrowers classed as ‘social’ by the SBs in question benefit from lower 
interest rates. Likewise, Becchetti et al. (2011) document that the SB in their study has an 
extremely high share of uncollateralized loans (around 42%). Both these studies find that the 
borrowers receiving fair credit offers have a lower propensity to behave opportunistically. This 
is in line with the fact that reciprocity and social identification—either individually or in 
conjunction—are increasingly recognized as powerful mechanisms to combat moral hazard 
problems (Fehr et al., 1997; Akerlof & Kranton, 2005; Chen & Li, 2009). In sum, our hypothesis 
H2 theorizes that SBs master the lending technology that allows them to fulfill their mission. 
Hypothesis H2. SBs support SEs by granting them loans at below-market interest rates: 
 ∆𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 = 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) − 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆) < 0        (2) 
where 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥)  is the interest charged to borrowers of bank x, where 𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆}. 
Let us now turn to SB depositors. It is clear that SBs need to collect resources at below-
market rates in order to be able to supply cheap credit to SEs. While some providers of social 
loans, such as microfinance institutions, receive subsidies and concessionary loans (Morduch, 
                                                          
3 Hard information is defined by Berger et al. (2005) as quantitative facts derived from audited financial statements, 
personal data, and repayments history. 
1999; D’Espallier et al., 2013), this is not the case with SBs, which evolve in a competitive 
banking environment and rely on socially responsible investors accepting lower than normal 
financial returns (Riedl & Smeets, 2017). In addition to motivated owners then, SBs need 
depositors who are willing to give up some remuneration of their capital to support the funding 
of social endeavors. However, the banking industry is plagued by asymmetric information, and 
SBs need credible commitments to convince depositors that low interest rates on deposits is not 
just another way for owners to make money. The main commitment devices mobilized by SBs 
relate to ownership structure and managerial design. Depositors are protected from owners’ 
opportunism by statutory or self-designed provisions (San Jose et al., 2011) while managerial 
strategies include the social screening of borrowers, operational transparency, simple 
intermediation principles, and reasonable staff compensation (Cornée et al., 2016 & 2018; 
Mykhayliv & Zauner, 2018).4 This next hypothesis echoes recent evidence from Krause and 
Battenfeld (2019, p. 889) that the clients of German SBs have ‘weaker preferences for financial, 
but stronger preferences for social return than conventional banking customers.’  
Hypothesis H3. The remuneration of depositors by SBs is at below-market interest rates:  
∆𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) − 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆) < 0          (3) 
where 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)  represent the remuneration of deposits in bank, 𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆}. 
From an organizational standpoint, these three hypotheses emphasize the fact that SBs 
are hybrid entities (Billis, 2010) in the sense that they address social issues while also ensuring 
their own financial sustainability. We contend that this business model is specific to SBs. When 
                                                          
4 Intuitively, using dual—social and financial—screening based on a relational approach should be more expensive 
than using a single, standard screening method (De Young et al., 2008). The issue of whether these additional costs 
are fully supported by the social investors is still a matter of debate. Cornée et al. (2018) find that SBs’ costs are 
not significantly different from those of their mainstream counterparts. A plausible interpretation is that the extra 
screening time is compensated for by cheaper labor costs (because SB employees are motivated by the social 
mission and accept below-market wages). 
there is no social orientation, banks are unable to attract investors or depositors willing to make 
financial sacrifices. 
3.2. The Differential Effect of Ownership: Social Banks vs. Stakeholder banks 
Ownership is a broad concept that can cover different practices depending on the legal status 
of the company in question. Because we consider SBs to be SEs (with a limited profit 
distribution), we would expect SBs to adopt an ownership structure that restricts opportunities 
for profit distribution. SB owners can be either member-owners of stakeholder banks—a group 
that comprises savings banks and, predominantly, cooperative banks—or shareholders of a 
capitalistic bank. The literature shows that stakeholder banks are less profitable than 
shareholder banks and that they exhibit less-risky investment strategies (Iannotta et al., 2007; 
Périlleux et al., 2016), offering lower returns in absolute terms but higher risk-adjusted returns 
(Hesse & Čihák, 2007). However, not all SBs are governed by a stakeholder ownership. In our 
sample, 39% of the SBs are governed by a shareholder status. As explained in Section 2, these 
SBs adopt self-regulatory arrangements aimed at limiting capital holders’ residual claims in 
terms of remuneration and power and therefore at reassuring their various stakeholders, not 
least their depositors. In contrast, SBs with a stakeholder-based governance design have no 
specific ownership structure when compared to their same-governance conventional 
counterparts. Hence, as a complement to H1, we expect the lower profitability feature to be 
present predominantly, if not exclusively, within the group of shareholder banks. We therefore 
formulate the hypothesis that the profitability gap of SBs is similar to that of stakeholder banks. 
Hypothesis H4: The returns delivered by stakeholder SBs (SBstake) to their owners are 
equal to those provided by stakeholder CBs (CBstake): 
∆ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟) = 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟) − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟) = 0       (4) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥) represents the return to owners of bank x, where 𝑥𝑥 ∈{𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟}. 
However, if H4 holds true, how are SBs different from other stakeholder banks? The 
answer to this question can be found in criterion (v) of the definition of SEs: They pursue a 
stated social mission. While cooperative and mutual organizations are primarily oriented 
toward their members’ interests, SBs serve a broad community and target the general interest 
(Gui, 1991; Kalmi, 2007). In the context of banking, cooperative banks carry out financial 
intermediation maximizing the interest of their membership by setting, for instance, borrowing 
rates that are favorable to their members (Angelini et al., 1998). SBs, on the other hand, finance 
projects of general interest and seek to offer attractive conditions to loans that promote the 
common good (Cornée & Szafarz, 2014).5 In other words, we expect that the difference 
between conventional stakeholder banks and social stakeholder banks is to be found in their 
intermediation design, which in turn depends on their pool of borrowers.  
The two next hypotheses are therefore similar to H2 and H3, but they apply exclusively 
to the restricted set of stakeholder banks.  
Hypothesis H5. Stakeholder SBs support SEs by granting them loans at below-market 
interest rates: 
 ∆𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟) = 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟) − 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟) < 0      (5) 
where 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥)  is the interest charged to borrowers of bank x, where 𝑥𝑥 ∈{𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}. 
                                                          
5 We are not saying here that in pursuing the mutual interest, (conventional) stakeholder banks do not generate 
positive externalities, but these positive externalities are of a different nature (i.e. financial and economic), such 
as stabilizing the financial sector (Hesse & Čihák, 2007) and mitigating any decrease in loan supply caused by 
monetary policy contractions (Ferri et al., 2014). 
Hypothesis H6. The remuneration of depositors by stakeholder SBs is at below-market 
interest rates:  
∆𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟) = 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟) − 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟) < 0       (6) 
where 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)  represent the remuneration of deposits in bank x, where 𝑥𝑥 ∈{𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟}. 
3.3. The Impact of Market Interest Rates on the Intermediation Design of Social Banks  
Different types of institutions provide funding to SEs. According to the classification developed 
by Cornée et al. (2018), the continuum of social finance institutions includes foundations 
offering pure grants, ‘quasi-foundations’ granting loans requiring only partial repayment, and 
SBs supplying soft loans. These institutions operate under a budget constraint that is dictated 
by their funders’ generosity. SBs lie somewhere between charities that waive all or part of their 
capital reimbursement and standard commercial banks charging the market interest rate to their 
borrowers. Following this logic, the most social SBs charge near-zero interest rates while the 
least social SBs charge just-below-market rates. Consequently, the leeway of SBs may be 
represented by an interest rate segment that is circumscribed by a lower limit of zero and an 
upper limit of the market interest rate. Inevitably, this interval shrinks during periods of low 
interest rates. This variability allows us to extend our theory about the SB business model. 
Let us consider the impact of the interest rates prevailing in the interbank market. These 
rates are the largest potential external factor impacting on the business model of banks. The 
banking literature reports on how bank characteristics, such as size, capitalization, and liquidity, 
influence the lending channel, i.e. how financial institutions adjust their credit supply and 
pricing following changes in monetary policy (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Gambacorta, 2008). 
We complement this research by focussing on how a SB’s social mission interferes with these 
adjustments and contend that SBs counteract rising market rates for two reasons. First, their 
main borrowers, SEs, cannot afford to pay high interest on their loans, so SBs tend to hold back 
the prices they charge. Second, as with stakeholder banks, using relational lending technology 
encourages SBs to smooth interest rate movements to help their clients manage transitions 
(Ferri et al., 2014).  
H7. The market interest rate has a negative moderating effect on the lending rate of SBs: 
 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 < 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆)𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕            (7) 
Another manifestation of this strategy should be observable during periods where market 
interest rates experience an upward trend. Mirroring H7, which states that SBs tend to smooth 
their lending rates, we contend that SBs also smooth their deposit rates more than other banks 
in response to rising market rates. 
H8. The market interest rate has a negative moderating effect on the deposit rate of SBs.  
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 < 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆)𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕                    (8) 
The unconventional monetary policy implemented by central banks in the aftermath of 
the 2007 Great Financial Crisis offers fertile ground for examining the effect of dramatically 
low interest rates on the intermediation features of SBs (Gerlach & Lewis, 2014; Borio & 
Gambacorta, 2017).6 Arguably, SBs are affected more than others when interest rates tend 
toward their zero bound because they can only keep the social spread on the loans they grant if 
they set negative rates on deposits, which is hardly feasible. Therefore, we predict that the 
                                                          
6 Specifically, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, central banks—including the European Central Bank—cut 
their interest rates aggressively (Gerlach & Lewis, 2014). These interest rates were still low at the end of our 
sample period, i.e. December 2013 (Borio & Gambacorta, 2017). 
second pillar of the SB business model is less efficient in a low interest rate environment than 
during normal periods. Our last two hypotheses formulate these predictions.  
H9. A low-rate environment has a positive moderating effect on the lending rate of SBs.  
𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) < 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆,𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)     (9) 
H10. A low-rate environment has a positive moderating effect on the deposit rate of SBs.  
𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) < 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆,𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)           (10) 
Table 1 summarizes the set of hypotheses that will be investigated below. 
***Insert Table 1 about here*** 
4. Data and Methods 
4.1. Data  
Our data are retrieved from the Bankscope database provided by Bureau van Dijk.7 The period 
covered by the sample extends from 1998 to 2013. For sample homogeneity, we retain only 
those banks located in the group of 20 countries classified as ‘Western Europe’ (i.e. the fifteen 
pre-2004 European Union members plus Cyprus, Iceland, Malta, Norway, and Switzerland) 
and for which financial information is available. Eastern European countries are excluded from 
this study because their banking market differs considerably from that of Western Europe and 
because SBs seldom exist in Eastern Europe. From this sample of 6,524 pre-selected banks, we 
exclude real-estate banks, public banks, and the central institutions of cooperative groups. Real-
estate and public banks are dissimilar to commercial, cooperative, and savings banks (Hesse & 
Čihák, 2007; Ferri et al., 2014 and 2015), and central cooperative institutions deal almost 
exclusively with intra-group transfers.  
                                                          
7 Bankscope is a standard data source for banks’ financial statements with a special focus on non-listed institutions 
(e.g. Gambacorta, 2005; Ashcraft, 2006; Iannotta et al., 2007; Ferri et al., 2014). 
Next, because SBs have no official status, we select the SBs in two steps. First, we assume 
that being a member of a SB organization guarantees the existence of a social mission. There 
are two such organizations: The European Federation of Ethical and Alternative Banks 
(FEBEA) and the Global Alliance for Banking on Values (GABV). FEBEA has 25 members. 
Twelve of these fulfill the necessary conditions for inclusion in our sample, that is they are 
located in Western Europe and they have the legal and fiscal status of a regular bank. Of the 55 
worldwide members of GABV, we select the 15 banks operating in Western Europe.8 Because 
six of the banks belong to both FEBEA and GABV, our sample at the end of this first step 
comprises 21 SBs.       
In the second step, we acknowledge that the literature (San Jose et al., 2011; Karl, 2015) 
also recognizes as social some institutions that are affiliated with neither FEBEA nor GABV. 
Applying geographic and statutory filters to these additional banks produces 25 potential SBs. 
However, because the literature is still vague on the definition of a SB, we double-check these 
additional banks against our definition of a SB. To do this, we analyze the institution-specific 
information (webpage, annual reports, etc.) for each candidate to find out if their social mission 
is to serve SEs. Eight out of the 25 candidates are selected on this basis (see Table A1 in 
Appendix A). Most of the excluded banks are directly managing the money of religious 
institutions. Adding these eight SBs to the 21 previously selected members of FEBEA and/or 
GABV yields a final sample of 29 SBs. 
 We exclude the 9 countries (e.g. Ireland) in which no SBs are identified, but all the major 
European Union countries are nevertheless still represented in our final sample of 11 countries. 
Ultimately, our analysis starts with around 40,000 points-observations, approximately 300 of 
                                                          
8 This group includes two banks (Ökobank eG and IntegraBank eG München) that were taken over by GLS 
Gemeinschaftsbank eG in 2003 and 2008, respectively.   
which relate to SBs (see Table 3).9 For all the banks, we use micro-level, unconsolidated, 
balance-sheet observations. There are two reasons for this. First, relying on unconsolidated data 
substantially increases the number of observations, especially for SBs with scant consolidated 
data. Dealing with unconsolidated data provides access to information from SBs that belong to 
conglomerates. For example, Crédit Coopératif is a subsidiary of France’s BPCE, and 
Algemene Spaarbank voor Nederland (ASN) belongs to the Dutch bank SNS REAAL. Second, 
comparing SBs, which are generally assumed to be small in size, with the global players in the 
financial system could hamper our conclusions. Using unconsolidated data therefore 
automatically breaks down the networks and holding companies formed by large banking 
groups into smaller entities, making our comparison between SBs and CBs more germane. 
Admittedly, it is possible that size differences may still affect our analysis and so create a 
mismatch between the two groups in our study. The interest rates used as controls are retrieved 
from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) database that is 
available online (https://data.oecd.org/).   
4.2. Sample Matching 
Although the number of SB point-observations (300) is statistically sufficient for further 
analysis, they make up less than 1% of all the point-observations in the full sample. To address 
any potential biases stemming from both missing data and a sample imbalance between SBs 
and CBs (Rubin, 1973), we use sample matching.10 The idea is to match each SB with up to 
four of its nearest neighbors in the other group (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009).  
To address the typical bias-variance trade-off in matching while also taking into account 
the lessons learned from the banking literature, we use a matching method based on the most 
                                                          
9 To avoid outliers, we remove the observations corresponding to the first and last percentiles of all variables, 
except Loans to assets, Deposits to assets, Liquidity, and Log of assets (see Table 2).   
10 We nevertheless run full-sample estimation as a robustness check. 
relevant characteristics (Pearl, 2000; King et al., 2011), hierarchized as country, ownership, and 
size. First, the dominance of a country relates to the key impact of jurisdiction on its banks’ 
performance, market structure, and stability. As confirmed by Beck et al. (2013b), cross-
country heterogeneity stems from regulatory and institutional features. Second, ownership 
structure is a distinctive characteristic that determines a bank’s legal social orientation, which 
in turn interplays with its value-based social orientation. This variable takes three forms, 
namely shareholder bank, cooperative bank, and savings bank (e.g. Ferri et al., 2014).11 Finally, 
bank size is instrumental in shaping features such as diversification (Demsetz & Strahan, 1997), 
funding strategies (Demirgüc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010), interest-rate setting (Kishan & Opiela, 
2000), and profitability (Bourke, 1989). Matching is based on bank size as computed in 2005, 
the midpoint of our study time interval.   
Our matching procedure consists of two steps. First, the banks are sorted by country, 
ownership, and size. Second, we match each SB with up to four same-country, same-ownership-
type CBs by using nearest-neighbor matching based on size (two above and two below).12 To 
rule out CBs with too few year-observations, there must be at least four occurrences in the 
dataset. Some SBs are matched with fewer than four CBs because above or below neighbors 
are missing in the same-country, same-ownership class. In sum, 24 SBs end up with four 
comparison banks, three with three, and the last two banks with only two.  
  
                                                          
11 The only UK-based SB with the legal status of a building society was matched with non-social building societies. 
Common in the UK, building societies are financial cooperatives that originally only provided mortgage loans but 
which now supply a wide range of financial services. In this empirical analysis, we group together cooperative 
banks and savings banks into a category labelled ‘stakeholder banks’. 
12 The only exception to the ‘same-ownership-type’ principle concerns the Dutch savings SB ASN, which is 
matched with Dutch shareholder banks of similar sizes. In fact, there is only one Dutch stakeholder bank in our 
sample, Rabobank, which is a cooperative bank. Its size is far too large to provide any relevant comparison.  
4.3. Regression Model 
We use multiple balance-sheet proxies for the three theoretical variables in Equations (1) to (8). 
Table 2 lists the proxies as well as the control variables used in the regressions. Following the 
empirical design suggested by Beck et al. (2013a), we run the following regression for each 
independent variable, Z, shown in Table 2: 
𝑍𝑍𝜕𝜕,𝑗𝑗,𝜕𝜕 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝜕𝜕,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝜕𝜕,𝑗𝑗,𝜕𝜕 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗,𝜕𝜕 + 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑇𝑇𝜕𝜕 + 𝜀𝜀𝜕𝜕,𝜕𝜕     (11) 
where indices i, j, and t stand for bank, country, and year, respectively, and where SB is a 
dummy that takes value 1 if the bank is social, X is a vector of characteristics that can vary 
according to the specification, M is vector of macroeconomic conditions, and C and T are 
country and year fixed effects, respectively.  
We use panel estimation because the banks in our sample are observed over several years. 
Hence, we run random-effect (RE) generalized-least-squares (GLS) models with standard-
errors clustered at the bank level. Treating the residual bank effect as random (random bank 
effects) rather than fixed is appropriate because our SB dummy of interest is time invariant. 
While the RE estimator is the most efficient, its consistency requires the stringent assumption 
that the bank effects are uncorrelated with the X vector.13 To gain consistency, we include 
country fixed effects.  
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
Our main goal is to test for differences between SBs and CBs. We have six proxy 
variables: two for Eq. (1), two for Eq. (2), and two for Eq. (3). The two proxies for owners’ 
remuneration are: return on assets (ROA) (net income over total assets) and risk-adjusted ROA 
                                                          
13 The relevance of all the estimated RE-GLS models, as compared to OLS, is attested by the Lagrangian Multiplier 
(LM) test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). The null hypothesis that the individual effect, μi, equals zero is uniformly 
rejected at the 1% significance level.   
(RAROA). ROA is the standard profitability measure, so we use it in the main regressions. 
However, it fails to reflect the risk associated with the bank’s business activity. As suggested 
by Mercieca et al. (2007), we therefore complement the analysis with risk-adjusted ROAs, 
which are sample means divided by the corresponding standard deviation as a robustness 
measure. Eq. (2) conjectures that SBs charge SEs below-market interest rates. The challenges 
in testing this hypothesis stem from the fact that we do not observe loan portfolios and that the 
interest that borrowers are charged depends on the riskiness of their projects. We use two 
proxies for the borrower interest rate: Interest rate on loans (interest income on loans over gross 
loans) and Interest rate on all earning assets (interest income over all earning assets). The first 
proxy is both accurate and unaffected by missing data. We use it in the baseline estimations. 
Finally, depositors’ remuneration can be represented by two proxies: the interest expenses on 
all liabilities (Interest rate on liabilities) and the interest expenses on customer deposits 
(Interest rate on customer deposits). The second proxy is more accurate, but its use is 
compromised by missing data. For this reason, we prefer using the first proxy in the main 
regressions.  
Vector X in Eq. (4) includes controls that could muddle the relationship between our 
dependent variables and Social bank. The list of controls, which comprises the above-
mentioned variables Log of assets and Stakeholder Ownership, is in keeping with the state of 
the art in the banking literature. Regarding Equity to assets, a positive link is often established 
between capitalization and ROA (e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010). Bank efficiency, 
proxied by Overhead, contributes to profitability (Goddard et al., 2004), and low Overhead 
ratios should reduce the interest rate on loans and increase that of deposits (Gambacorta, 2008). 
Arguably, both bank owners and depositors may be inclined to ask for a premium on their 
remuneration as a function of the bank’s liquidity (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983), which also 
impacts lending strategies (Kashyap et al., 2002). 
A bank’s asset and liability composition (Loans and Deposits) reflects its business 
orientation, which is key to its rate-setting policy and performance (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Huizinga, 1999). The impact of Credit risk—that is loan loss provisions over gross loans—on 
profitability is ambiguous (Iannotta et al., 2007). On the one hand, it might be positive to a 
certain extent because riskier loans lead to higher interest rates. On the other, high workout fees 
on defaulting loans harm profitability, and asset quality impairment raises the cost of funding 
(Mester, 1996). In line with the literature, we add the macroeconomic factors most likely to 
impact banking activities: Herfindahl-Hirschman market concentration index (Market 
concentration), overnight interbank rate (Interbank rate), inflation rate (Inflation), and GDP 
growth rate (GDP growth) (Bertay et al., 2013). Market concentration, Inflation, and GDP 
growth are computed at the country level, while Interbank rate is obtained at the monetary-
zone level.14 Finally, the dummy variable Low Interest Rates captures the shift in monetary 
policy that followed the onset of the Great Financial Crisis, equaling zero until 2007 and one 
from 2008 onward (Borio & Gambacorta, 2017).  
4.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents the means for both the SBs and the matched CBs and shows the t-test results 
for equal means. All the significant differences between the SB and CB dependent variable 
means have the signs predicted by our theoretical hypotheses. However, in respect of the 
profitability measures, the difference in means for RAROA is not statistically significant.  
***Insert Table 3 about here*** 
Table 3 provides insights into the variables that serve as controls in the next section. 
Because of the matching procedure, stakeholder banks are equally prevalent among CBs and 
                                                          
14 Inflation rate and GPD growth rate are downloaded from the Bankscope database while the Herfindahl-
Hirschman concentration index is computed from this database. Interbank rate is the yearly averaged overnight 
interbank rate (e.g. EONIA in the Eurozone) provided by the OECD.  
SBs. Matching narrows the gap in bank size between the two groups, in terms of both level 
(from €3.3 billion in the full sample to – €1.2 billion in the matched sample) and standard 
deviation (from €52.59 billion in the full sample to €5.28 billion in the matched sample). SBs 
have higher deposit-to-asset ratios and lower loan-to-asset ratios than CBs. Cornée et al. (2016) 
argue that this excess liquidity is indirect evidence that SBs adhere to their mission and select 
their borrowers rigorously. Nevertheless, high selectivity may be costly both financially and 
from a reputational point of view because it constrains the bank’s ability to transform deposits 
from motivated savers into loans.  
5. Regression Analysis 
This section addresses the predictions about the SB business model, which are described in 
Subsections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, respectively.  
5.1. The Core Business Model 
The predictions formulated above about the core business model of SBs produced three 
hypotheses (H1, H2, H3), which all relate to the sign and significance level of the SB dummy 
variable in different regressions.  
Regarding the first pillar of the business model, we test whether SBs are less profitable 
than other banks (H1). This is a theoretical implication of the fact that socially minded investors 
are ready to accept a financial sacrifice to make the SB’s mission possible. The regression 
results indicated in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 support the idea of motivated ownership. 
SBs are associated with a decrease in ROA of about 20 basis points, regardless of the inclusion 
of bank and macro control variables. H1 is empirically validated.  
***Insert Table 4 about here*** 
Regarding the specific intermediation mechanism viewed as the second pillar of the SB 
core business model, we investigate whether, in terms of lending, SBs manage to offer more 
advantageous credit conditions than other banks. The intuition in H2 is that SB borrowers are 
SEs, and the banks’ mission is to support these enterprises. The estimations reported in columns 
(3) and (4) of Table 4 focus on the loan interest rates. Both regressions confirm at the 1% level 
that SBs charge lower rates than their non-social counterparts. They suggest that SBs are 
passing their funders’ financial sacrifice on to their borrowers, who benefit from an interest rate 
rebate of at least 140 bps per annum. It could be argued that the interest rate differential between 
SBs and CBs is chiefly driven by differences in credit quality. To address this potential issue, 
we control for credit risk. Overall, H2 receives empirical confirmation. 
In terms of the funding side of SBs, we check for the sacrifice made by SB depositors 
posited in H3. In columns (5) and (6) of Table 4, the dependent variable is a proxy of the interest 
rate on deposits, Interest rate on liabilities. Regarding sign and significance at the 1% level, 
both regressions deliver the same outcome, that is depositors’ returns are significantly smaller 
in SBs than in their non-social counterparts. The point-estimates in columns (5) and (6) indicate 
a sacrifice of around 40 bps per annum, which is in line with H3. It could be argued that these 
results are driven by the fact that SB depositors choose distinctive, shorter-term savings 
products, making SB liabilities less remunerative when compared to those of their conventional 
counterparts. We cannot rule out this possibility, but it would contradict the evidence that 
socially responsible investors have a typically long-term focus (Cox et al., 2004). Taken 
together, the results support the hypotheses that both investors and depositors are willing to 
make financial sacrifices when putting money into SBs. 
  
5.2. Social Banks and Stakeholder Banks 
Table 5 highlights the similarities between SBs and stakeholder banks. Despite the low levels 
of significance attributable to the matching procedure (see the full-sample regressions in 
Appendix B), the Stakeholder ownership dummy coefficients have the same signs as the SB 
coefficients. Hence, stakeholder banks have low profitability and use below-market lending 
interest rates. This can be attributed to their ability to address information asymmetries 
efficiently while refusing to use the resulting bargaining power to ‘hold up’ their borrowers 
(Angelini et al., 1998). Low rates on the liability side are, however, counterintuitive for 
cooperative banks, which constitute 71% of the stakeholder banks in our sample. Standard 
theory predicts that cooperative banks are expected to maximize the return on deposits (Smith 
et al., 1981). In a historical perspective, both Banerjee et al. (1994) and Guinnane (1994) 
contend that high rates on deposits can help cooperative banks attract local savings and so 
prevent imbalances between net borrowers and net savers.  
***Insert Table 5 about here*** 
To disentangle the direct impacts both of SBs and of stakeholder status (applicable in 
61% of cases), we rerun our baseline regressions in the sub-sample of stakeholder banks. In this 
sample, H4 predicts a zero impact on ROA, while H5 and H6 mimic the full-sample predictions 
about the loan and deposit rates. In column (1) of Table 5, we observe that the ROA delivered 
by SBs is not significantly different from that of other stakeholder banks, which validates H4. 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 show that the levels of interest rates should be lower on both 
sides of the balance sheet given the explicit social orientation of SBs, thereby validating H5 and 
H6, respectively.  
  
5.3. Social Banks and Market Interest Rates 
The monetary environment is key to financial intermediation. Our previous estimations 
acknowledge this evidence by controlling for the interbank interest rate, which conditions the 
interest rates set by banks on both sides of their balance sheets. We explore whether and, if so, 
how monetary environment affects the SB business model. In Table 6, we capture potential 
effects in two ways. First, we interact the Interbank rate with the Social Bank dummy (columns 
(1) and (3)). Second, we exploit the post-2007 low-interest period by interacting two dummies, 
Low interest rates and Social Bank (columns (2) and (4)). The empirical results support 
Hypotheses H7 to H10, however sometimes with only low significance. The overall message 
is twofold. First, when market interest rates move upward, SBs adopt smoothing strategies to 
offer affordable rates to SE borrowers and subsequently set lower deposits rates. Second, low 
interest rates can push the SB model toward its limits. Even socially oriented depositors would 
not accept capital meltdown because of negative interest rates. As a consequence, SBs cannot 
keep the social spread on lending rates.        
***Insert Table 6 about here*** 
6. Robustness Checks  
6.1. Alternative Samples  
The regression results from the matching procedure support our theoretical framework. 
However, the matching procedure drastically reduces the size of our dataset from 5,448 banks 
to 145. In this section, we check whether the results from full-sample estimation are consistent 
with the matched-sample results. While full-sample estimation (in Tables B1 and B2) allows 
us to exploit the data from a large sample of banks, it exposes the results to sample imbalances 
linked to the small proportion—less than 1%—of SBs in the set. 
According to Table B1, our key findings on the impact of the Social bank dummy are 
also observable in the results obtained from both the full, all-bank sample (Panel A) and the 
sample made up of all stakeholder banks (Panel B). Table B2 reports the effects of market rates. 
These findings are aligned with the baseline results. In addition, the loading of the SB*low 
interest rate interaction term gains statistical power.        
Despite missing-data issues, the full-sample estimators have higher significance levels. 
The increase is particularly noticeable with some control variables, including the stakeholder-
bank dummy. The loadings of controls are in line with both the literature (see Section 4.3) and 
the results from our matching procedure (see Sections 5.1 to 5.3). Equity influences ROA 
positively. The cost variable Overhead pushes the loan interest rate upward and the interest rate 
on deposits downward. It is negatively related to profitability. Credit risk has a positive impact 
on both loan and deposit rates and a detrimental effect on profitability. Overall, meaningful 
control coefficients add consistency to our main results.  
It could be argued that the second step in the SB selection process, described in Section 
4.1, might be compromised by subjectivity. To address this concern, we carried out a robustness 
check by restricting the sample to just the 21 FEBEA and/or GABV members. The results 
shown in Table B3 are similar to those from the baseline regressions, albeit with a reduced 
statistical power, which is attributable to the smaller sample size.   
6.2. Alternative Variables 
Our hypotheses can be tested using alternative proxies for the dependent variables. In the 
baseline estimations, we use our preferred specifications for reasons pertaining to both accuracy 
and data availability. In Table B4, we present the results from the replicated analyses using 
alternative dependent variables but the same regressors. Specifically, we replace ROA, Interest 
rate on liabilities, and Interest rate on loans with RAROA, Interest rate on customer deposits, 
and Interest rate on all earning assets, respectively. Columns (1) and (4) explaining RAROA 
show that we use OLS estimation because RAROA is time invariant—it is the mean value of 
ROA divided by its standard deviation. For the sake of consistency, we also average the control 
variable over the sample period. The fixed country effects are still relevant.  
Overall, the estimations displayed in Table B4 are consistent with our baseline results. 
However, it is worth mentioning that in the RAROA equation in Panel A, column (1), the 
loadings of the SB and stakeholder-bank dummies have opposite signs. Likewise, Panel B, 
which is restricted to stakeholder banks, shows that SBs are less profitable than stakeholder 
banks (at the 10% level) when risk is accounted for in profitability. Our findings confirm those 
of Hesse and Čihák (2007), who find that conventional stakeholder banks have both low 
profitability and low return volatility. In addition, the SBs with stakeholder ownership have a 
higher return volatility than their conventional counterparts. This effect may stem from the 
inherent risks associated with funding ventures in the social sector. In Columns (9) and (10) of 
Panel C, the low significance levels of the interaction terms of interest are probably due to the 
limited sample size. Finally, a complementary regression analysis in which ROA is replaced 
either by the return on equity (ROE) or by the risk-adjusted ROE (RAROE) delivers 
(unreported) estimations that are well aligned with the baseline results, both economically and 
statistically.  
Table B5 presents the results from our analysis of the moderating effect of market 
concentration, which we conduct to assess the validity of our results when accounting for 
competition in the banking market (Fungácová et al., 2014). Banks that are active in a 
concentrated market tend to use their price-setting power in line with their bottom lines (Meyer, 
2018). For profit-oriented banks, market power can typically translate into rising lending rates 
(D’Auria et al., 1999). By contrast, our results confirm the findings of previous studies (Cornée 
et al., 2012) that SBs do not take advantage of increased market power to raise the interest they 
charge. On the funding side, however, the negative and significant coefficient of the SB*market 
concentration interaction term is puzzling. It seems to indicate that SB depositors in 
concentrated markets are keener than others to accept smaller deposit remunerations. 
Hypothetically, in moderately concentrated markets, small-scale community or stakeholder 
banks compete with SBs to attract the money of socially minded depositors. An alternative 
rationale suggests there are behavioral factors at play, such as depositors’ inattention, because 
SBs do not communicate on deposit remuneration. Overall, the estimated interaction effects 
add credibility to the theorized business model of social banking. 
6.3. Tests on Selection on Unobservables 
To address the issue of potential omitted variables, we run tests on selection on unobservables 
in line with the developments of Oster (2019), whose work extends that of Altonji et al. (2005). 
The Oster test exploits the information in R-squared changes when moving from uncontrolled 
to controlled regressions. We carry out the analysis from Eq. (11). Let ?̂?𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽�1 denote the 
estimated coefficients of Social bank with and without the observable controls, respectively, 
and 𝑅𝑅� and 𝑅𝑅� denote the corresponding R-squared. To gauge the omitted variable bias of our 
estimates, we use the approximation of the bias-adjusted effect suggested by Oster (2019):15   
𝛽𝛽1
∗ ≈ 𝛽𝛽�1
∗ = ?̂?𝛽1 − 𝛿𝛿�𝛽𝛽�1 − ?̂?𝛽1� 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−𝑅𝑅�𝑅𝑅�−𝑅𝑅�          (12)  
where 𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚 is the R-squared of a hypothetical regression on the Social bank variable and both 
observed and unobserved controls. The test is as follows: If the interval delimited by ?̂?𝛽1 and 
𝛽𝛽�1
∗ excludes zero, then the value of ?̂?𝛽1 is not driven by omitted variables. As recommended by 
Oster (2019), we set 𝛿𝛿 to 1, suggesting that the observables are at least as important as the 
                                                          
15 The implementation of the Oster (2019) test is proposed as a Stata command (‘psacalc’), developed by the 
author. Since this general procedure is still unavailable for our baseline RE-GLS model, we use the simple 
approximation formula obtained under the assumption that the unobservable and observables are equally related 
to the treatment (Oster, 2019).  
unobservables, and we use the values of 1 and 1.3 as 𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚 bounds. Based on the estimates from 
Table 4, Table B6 (in Appendix B) shows that none of the results from our baseline equations 
can be attributed to omitted variables.   
7. Conclusion  
While SBs have developed rapidly since the 2007 financial crisis and their asset growth has 
outpaced that of the conventional sector (Weber & Remer, 2011), they are still a relatively small 
part of the banking sector. Nevertheless, their success justifies an increased scholarly interest 
in a business model that apparently manages to ‘bank on’ values. Positioned on the other side 
of the credit market, the future of the SE sector in Europe depends on the availability of funding. 
With mainstream banks often reluctant to lend to SEs, much of this sector has historically been 
reliant on public funding. SBs, which attract motivated fund providers willing to make financial 
sacrifices for social causes, represent an emerging alternative to public funding and mainstream 
banks for SEs.  
To remain in business, however, SBs need to be financially sustainable. While the 
market gap they fill is delivering credit to SEs that are typically not profitable enough (or too 
risky) to obtain loans from CBs, their business model, which takes advantage of social 
motivation, allows them to survive in a competitive credit market. This is a remarkable 
achievement, providing additional proof that the fruitful development of social economic 
initiatives in a market-oriented economy is possible without public subsidies. However, our 
results highlight the fragility of the original social banking business model when it faces a low 
interest rate environment. Low interest rates put SBs at risk because they compromise the 
sustainability of supplying below-market conditions to socially oriented borrowers. 
The topic of social banking is a recent one in the academic literature, and both the 
boundaries of social banking and the differences between social and stakeholder (cooperative) 
banks are still unclear to many scholars. This paper contributes to clarifying these issues. It 
shows that, despite their essential differences, SBs and stakeholder banks share key 
characteristics. Our results suggest that both types of institutions serve the two sides of financial 
intermediation with interest rates that are lower than those prevailing in the banking market—
albeit the patterns exhibited by SBs are stronger. It is possible that these results stem from 
similarities in identity-based economic relationships. With both types of bank, non-financial 
considerations––shared social values for the SBs, and mutual interest and local embeddedness 
for the cooperatives––can motivate investors and depositors to make financial sacrifices. 
Financial support given for the common good or the community is channeled to borrowers by 
bankers who avoid diverting the deposited funds into speculative and premium-generating 
transactions. Our results also emphasize that limiting residual ownership rights is instrumental 
in the success of these alternative intermediation mechanisms.  
Interestingly, our results offer promising avenues for future research on socially oriented 
financial institutions around the world. By providing a new, broader perspective on how SBs 
operate, the business model described in this paper proposes a framework for analyzing closely 
related organizations, such as microfinance institutions (some of which already belong to 
GABV). Like SBs, microfinance institutions often have access to cheaper resources on the 
liability side of their balance sheet, which enables them to target vulnerable borrowers and so 
increase their social performance. However, extending our framework to microfinance 
institutions means that two types of issues specific to the microfinance sector have to be 
addressed. First, the business models of most microfinance institutions still rely on subsidies to 
push forward their social agenda (D’Espallier et al., 2013; Cull et al., 2018). Second, 
formalizing a social mission is probably more complex for microfinance institutions than for 
SBs due to the prevalence of multiple heterogeneous objectives in the sector (Armendariz & 
Szafarz, 2011; Mersland et al., 2019; Värendh Månsson et al., 2019). 
Our study cannot be accused of endogeneity because the social character of banks is 
chosen when they are founded. However, certain refinements of our conceptual approach could 
help elucidate both sides of the intermediation model presented in this paper. For example, on 
the funding side, a dynamic model could help scrutinize the development over time of features 
specific to SBs. In addition, monitoring the sacrifices that funders are willing to make could 
determine how long it takes to build a SB’s reputation. A fruitful avenue for exploring the 
lending side further consists in gauging how SE heterogeneity impacts the SB business model. 
Moreover, the success of SBs and their propagation into mainstream banking groups raises new 
questions. For instance, what are the managerial implications of SBs joining CB groups? This 
issue and many others deserve further examination, for example through case studies.  
Our results revive the debate about how social banking should be regulated. The current 
situation, that is the one-size-fits-all Basel framework, which is meant to level the playing field 
in international capital markets, is probably poorly adapted to the SB business model for several 
reasons (Ferri & Neuberger, 2015). First, the Basel framework compels banks to rely 
exclusively on hard information to monitor credit risk and fulfill the regulatory capital 
requirements (Rajan et al., 2010). This view contradicts the fundaments of the relational 
approach needed to carefully serve SEs. Second, the Basel principles encourage banks to 
securitize their loan portfolios and use sophisticated financial products (Diamond & Rajan, 
2009), which is opposed to the transparency principles upheld by SBs. Finally, access to bank 
status is demanding in terms of compliance costs (Ferri & Neuberger, 2015), which may explain 
why many socially oriented financial intermediaries in Europe opt for ‘non-bank’ status.        
Adopting a holistic approach, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the SB 
business model. Given the recurrent issues faced by the mainstream financial system, much 
more can doubtless be learned from nascent efforts to explore alternative paths like social 
banking.  
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Table 1. Business Model: Predicted Signs 
 
Outcome 
 
Treatment 
Return on assets 
(ROA) Rate charged to borrowers Rate paid to depositors 
Social bank (SB) H1: negative H2: negative H3: negative 
SB*stakeholder ownership H4: null H5: negative H6: negative 
SB*market rate  H7: negative H8: negative 
SB*low interest rates H9: positive H10: positive 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Definition of Variables   
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Owners’ sacrifice  
Return on assets (ROA, %) Net income / total assets 
Risk-adjusted ROA (RAROA, %) Mean ROA / standard deviation of ROA from 1998 to 2013 
Lending rates   
Interest rate on loans (%) Interest income from loans / gross loans 
Interest rate on all earning assets (%) All interest income / all earning assets 
Depositors’ sacrifice  
Interest rate on liabilities (%)  All interest expenses / all liabilities 
Interest rate on customer deposits (%) Interest expenses from deposits / customer deposits 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Bank-specific characteristics  
Social bank  Dummy=1 if the bank is a social bank  
Stakeholder bank Dummy=1 if the bank is a cooperative or savings bank 
Log of assets  Log (total assets) 
Equity to assets (%) Equity / total assets 
Overhead (%) Operational costs / total assets 
Liquidity (%) Loans / deposits  
Loans to assets (%) Loans / total assets 
Deposits to assets (%) Deposits / total assets 
Credit risk (%) Loan loss provisions / gross loans 
Macroeconomic variables   
Market concentration  Herfindahl-Hirschman market concentration index for assets 
Interbank rate (%) Overnight interbank rate  
Inflation (%) Inflation rate  
GDP growth (%) Growth rate of gross domestic product  
 
  
Table 3. Summary Statistics: Social versus Conventional Banks 
Variables Social banks  
(SBs) 
Conventional banks (CBs) T-test for equal 
means 
Dependent variables  
Return on assets (ROA, %) 0.31 (0.49), [N=304] 0.52 (0.67), [N=1,194] 5.18*** 
Risk-adjusted ROA (RAROA, %) 1.37 (1.18), [N=26] 2.11 (2.29), [N=104] 1.58 
Interest rate on loans (%) 5.46 (1.61), [N=187] 6.96 (3.37), [N=757] 5.91*** 
Interest rate on all earning assets (%) 4.42 (1.28), [268] 5.18 (2.24), [N=1,138] 5.34*** 
Interest rate on liabilities (%)  2.16 (1.09), [N=261] 2.74 (1.63), [N=1,131] 5.47*** 
Interest rate on customer deposits (%) 1.74 (1.13), [N=121] 2.53 (2.18), [N=413] 3.79*** 
Bank control variables  
Stakeholder bank  0.61 (0.48), [N=457]  0.61 (0.48), [N=1,744] -0.007 
Log of assets 6.15 (1.93), [N=307] 5.92 (1.77), [N=1,268] -2.02**    
Equity to assets (%) 7.56 (3.78), [N=300] 11.39 (8.48), [N=1,238] 7.62*** 
Overhead (%) 2.01 (1.18) [N=268] 2.53 (1.57) [N=1,168] 5.11*** 
Liquidity (%) 85.03 (38.60) [N=286] 124.85 (150.08) [N=1,164] 4.45*** 
Loans to assets (%) 54.48 (21.40) [N=296] 55.30 (25.55) [N=1,247] 0.51 
Deposits to assets (%) 74.04 (19.90) [N=306] 61.08 (26.73) [1,242] -7.95*** 
Credit risk (%) 0.50 (0.63) [N=239] 0.68 (0.94) [N=1,034] 2.76*** 
Macro control variables  
Market concentration  0.17 (0.13) [N=457] 0.17 (0.13) [N=1,712] -0.56 
Interbank rate (%) 2.40 (1.75) [N=457] 2.35 (1.70) [N=1,744] -0.52 
Inflation (%) 1.89 (0.92) [N=457] 1.86 (0.93) [N=1,744] -0.57 
GDP growth (%) 1.48 (2.19) [N=457] 1.51 (2.21) [N=1,744] 0.28 
Note: ***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The number N of point-
observations is given in brackets.  
 
  
Table 4. The Core Business Model of Social Banks   
  ROA Interest rate on loans Interest rate on liabilities 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Social bank -0.29*** -0.24*** -1.44*** -1.61*** -0.47*** -0.44*** 
  (0.081) (0.091) (0.302) (0.472) (0.108) (0.122) 
Stakeholder ownership   -0.004  -1.83**   -0.06 
    (0.139)  (0.786)   (0.175) 
Log of assets   0.08**  -0.31   0.08* 
    (0.032)  (0.230)   (0.045) 
Equity to assets   0.03***  -0.08**   -0.02** 
    (0.009)  (0.037)   (0.010) 
Overhead   -0.07  -0.20*   -0.08** 
    (0.049)  (0.118)   (0.036) 
Liquidity    0.00     -0.00 
    (0.000)     (0.00) 
Deposits to assets         -0.01** 
          (0.005) 
Loans to assets   -0.000  -0.05***     
    (0.002)  (0.016)     
Credit risk   -0.23***  0.18   0.07** 
    (0.039)  (0.124)   (0.029) 
Market concentration    -0.35  5.38   1.19** 
    (0.332)  (3.615)   (0.553) 
Interbank rate   -0.10**  0.34***   0.36*** 
    (0.046)  (0.083)   (0.032) 
Inflation    -0.01  -0.16   -0.07** 
    (0.029)  (0.099)   (0.032) 
GDP growth    0.03**  -0.05   -0.07*** 
    (0.014)  (0.050)   (0.021) 
Constant 0.54*** 0.81*** 6.78*** 13.48*** 2.59*** 2.99*** 
  (0.041) (0.285) (0.303) (2.241) (0.084) (0.664) 
Country fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
LM test 480.66*** 167.70*** 1350.34*** 518.19*** 796.39*** 1024.02*** 
# Observations 1,498 1,190 944 836 1,349 1,109 
# Banks 135 124 115 111 132 124 
R2  0.018 0.28  0.036  0.43  0.0246  0.71  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Random-effect GLS estimation with standard errors clustered at the bank 
level (in parentheses). LM = Lagrangian multiplier.  
 
  
Table 5. Social Banks and Stakeholder Ownership  
 Stakeholder banks only 
  ROA Interest rate on loans 
Interest rate on 
liabilities 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
Social bank (SB) -0.05 -0.48*** -0.37*** 
  (0.070) (0.187) (0.131) 
Constant 1.44*** 8.41*** 2.14*** 
  (0.339) (0.831) (0.529) 
Bank & Macro variables Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
LM test 102.64*** 371.27*** 743.70*** 
# Observations 841 577 785 
# Banks 83 76 83 
R2 0.40  0.71  0.75  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Random-effect GLS estimation with standard errors clustered at the bank 
level (in parentheses). LM = Lagrangian multiplier.  
 
 
 
Table 6. Social Banks and Market Interest Rates 
  Interest rate on loans Interest rate on liabilities 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Social bank (SB) -1.20*** -1.77*** -0.30** -0.53*** 
  (0.385) (0.495) (0.122) (0.135) 
SB*interbank rate -0.16*  -0.07   
  (0.085)  (0.043)   
SB*low interest rates   0.49*   0.18** 
   (0.288)   (0.090) 
Interbank rate 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 
  (0.085) (0.082) (0.033) (0.033) 
Low interest rates   -3.40***   -1.28*** 
   (0.911)   (0.169) 
Constant 11.19*** 11.27*** 2.97*** 3.02*** 
  (1.854) (1.886) (0.650) (0.651) 
All other control var. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LM test 523.67*** 501.11*** 1038.60*** 892.63*** 
# Observations 836 836 1,109 1,109 
# Banks 111 111 124 124 
R2 0.43  0.44  0.71  0.70  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Random-effect GLS estimation with standard errors clustered at the bank 
level (in parentheses). LM = Lagrangian multiplier.  
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Appendix A: Selection of Social Banks 
Table A1. Sample of Social Banks  
Bank Country Legal status 
Andelskassen OIKOS Denmark Stakeholder (coop) bank 
Folkesparekassen* Denmark Stakeholder (savings) bank 
Merkur - Den Almennyttige Andelskasse* Denmark Stakeholder (coop) bank 
Crédit Coopératif* France Stakeholder (coop) bank 
La Nef* France Stakeholder (coop) bank 
Bank für Sozialwirtschaft Aktiengesellschaft* Germany Shareholder bank 
GLS Gemeinschaftsbank eG* Germany Stakeholder (coop) bank 
IntegraBank eG München* Germany Stakeholder (coop) bank 
Ökobank eG* Germany Stakeholder (coop) bank 
Steyler Bank GmbH Germany Shareholder bank 
UmweltBank AG* Germany Shareholder bank 
Banca Popolare Etica SPA* Italy Stakeholder (coop) bank 
Cassa Padana Banca di Credito* Italy Stakeholder (coop) bank 
Cassa Rurale di Bolzano Soc. Cooperativa* Italy Stakeholder (coop) bank 
Eticredito-Banca Etica Adriatica SpA Italy Shareholder bank 
APS Bank Limited* Malta Shareholder bank 
Algemene Spaarbank voor Nederland - ASN Bank NV Netherlands Stakeholder (savings) bank 
Triodos Bank NV* Netherlands Shareholder bank 
Cultura Sparebank* Norway Stakeholder (savings) bank 
Caja Laboral Popular Coop. de Credito Spain Stakeholder (coop) bank 
Colonya, Caixa d'Estalvis de Pollença* Spain Stakeholder (savings) bank 
Ekobanken medlemsbank* Sweden Stakeholder (coop) bank 
Alternative Bank Schweiz ABS* Switzerland Shareholder bank 
Freie Gemeinschaftsbank BCL* Switzerland Stakeholder (coop) bank 
CAF Bank Ltd UK Shareholder bank 
Charity Bank Limited (The)* UK Shareholder bank 
Co-operative Bank Plc (The) UK Shareholder bank 
Ecology Building Society (The)* UK Stakeholder (coop) bank 
Reliance Bank Limited UK Shareholder bank 
Note: * member of GABV or FEBEA.  
 
 
  
Appendix B: Robustness Checks  
 
Table B1. Alternative Sample: Full-Sample Regressions (1) 
  
Panel A: Core business model  Panel B: Stakeholder banks only 
  
ROA  Int. rate on loans 
Int. rate on 
liabilities ROA  
Int. rate on 
loans 
Int. rate on 
liabilities 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Social bank (SB) -0.23** -0.60*** -0.30*** -0.06 -0.37** -0.34** 
  (0.103) (0.221) (0.098) (0.062) (0.163) (0.136) 
Stakeholder ownership -0.11*** -0.77*** -0.07**      
  (0.027) (0.124) (0.034)      
Log of assets 0.01*** -0.01 0.07*** -0.00 -0.01 0.05*** 
  (0.005) (0.022) (0.007) (0.004) (0.016) (0.005) 
Equity to assets  0.04*** 0.00 -0.02*** 0.06*** 0.02** -0.02*** 
  (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) 
Overhead -0.06*** 0.22*** -0.06*** -0.14*** 0.35*** -0.08*** 
  (0.012) (0.038) (0.011) (0.011) (0.025) (0.011) 
Loans to assets -0.00 -0.04***   -0.00* -0.04***   
  (0.000) (0.002)   (0.000) (0.001)   
Liquidity  0.00  0.00*** -0.00***  0.00** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Deposits to assets   -0.01***    -0.01*** 
    (0.001)    (0.001) 
Credit risk -0.16*** 0.04*** 0.02*** -0.13*** 0.05*** 0.01** 
  (0.006) (0.015) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) 
Interbank rate -0.05*** 0.39*** 0.38*** -0.06*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 
  (0.009) (0.030) (0.017) (0.008) (0.020) (0.015) 
Constant 1.02*** 8.24*** 2.61*** 1.18*** 7.07*** 2.47*** 
  (0.094) (0.408) (0.147) (0.078) (0.213) (0.136) 
Other macro variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (#) 42,666 35,289 39,974 36,700 30,872 34,472 
Banks (#) 4,728 4,503 4,679 3,860 3,740 3,840 
R2 0.30  0.55  0.73  0.40  0.74  0.83  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Random-effect GLS estimation with standard errors clustered at the bank 
level (in parentheses). 
 
 
  
Table B2. Alternative Sample: Full-Sample Regressions (2)  
 Social banks and market interest rates 
Dependent variable 
Interest rate on loans Interest rate on liabilities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Social bank (SB) -0.46* -0.77*** -0.23** -0.40*** 
  (0.246) (0.224) (0.093) (0.117) 
SB*interbank rate -0.08*  -0.04  
  (0.046)  (0.036)  
SB*low interest rates   0.27**  0.17** 
   (0.116)  (0.069) 
Stakeholder ownership -0.77*** -0.77*** -0.07** -0.07** 
  (0.124) (0.124) (0.034) (0.034) 
Log of assets -0.02 -0.02 0.07*** 0.07*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.007) (0.007) 
Equity to assets 0.00 0.00 -0.02*** -0.02*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) 
Overhead 0.22*** 0.22*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.011) (0.011) 
Loans to assets -0.04*** -0.04***   
  (0.002) (0.002)   
Liquidity    0.00*** 0.00*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Deposits to assets   -0.01*** -0.01*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Credit risk 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) 
Interbank rate 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.017) (0.017) 
Low interest rates   -2.10***  -1.34*** 
   (0.131)  (0.052) 
Constant 8.24*** 8.24*** 2.61*** 2.61*** 
  (0.408) (0.408) (0.147) (0.147) 
Other macro variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (#) 35,289 35,289 39,974 39,974 
Banks (#) 4,503 4,503 4,679 4,679 
R2  0.55 0.55  0.73  0.73  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Random-effect GLS estimation with standard errors clustered at the bank 
level (in parentheses).   
Table B3. Alternative Sample: Social Bank Members of FEBEA and/or GABV   
Dependent variable 
Panel A: Core business model Panel B: Stakeholder banks only Panel C: Social banks and market interest rates  
ROA  Int. rate on loans 
Int. rate on 
liabilities ROA  
Int. rate on 
loans 
Int. rate on 
liabilities Int. rate on loans Int. rate on liabilities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                
Social bank -0.16* -0.77** -0.45*** -0.04 -0.49** -0.31* -0.46 -1.15*** -0.41*** -0.52*** 
  (0.094) (0.313) (0.155) (0.080) (0.205) (0.162) (0.327) (0.405) (0.159) (0.171) 
SB*Interbank rate           -0.17*  -0.02   
            (0.097)  (0.042)   
SB*Low interest rates             0.64*  0.12 
              (0.334)  (0.095) 
Interbank rate -0.10* 0.43*** 0.35*** -0.07 0.32*** 0.37*** 0.49*** 0.45*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 
  (0.054) (0.125) (0.036) (0.047) (0.108) (0.038) (0.126) (0.116) (0.038) (0.038) 
Low interest rates             -3.00***  -1.05*** 
              (0.825)  (0.201) 
Constant 1.01** 9.14*** 3.66*** 1.54*** 7.73*** 2.63*** 8.99*** 9.23*** 3.67*** 3.72*** 
  (0.484) (1.698) (0.758) (0.355) (0.899) (0.649) (1.677) (1.711) (0.763) (0.766) 
Other bank & macro var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (#) 877 623 815 683 494 633 623 623 815 815 
Banks (#) 92 81 92 68 63 68 81 81 92 92 
R2  0.30 0.50   0.73  0.37  0.70  0.73  0.50  0.51  0.73  0.73 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Random-effect GLS estimation with standard errors clustered at the bank level (in parentheses). 
  
Table B4. Alternative Dependent Variables  
Dependent variable 
Panel A: Core business model Panel B: Stakeholder banks only Panel C: Social banks and market interest rates  
RARO
A  
Int. rate on all 
earning assets 
Int. rate on 
customer 
deposits 
RAROA  Int. rate on all earning assets 
Int. rate on 
customer 
deposits 
Int. rate on all earning 
assets 
Int. rate on customer 
deposits 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                      
Social bank -1.01** -0.52*** -0.70** -1.03* -0.39** -0.37*** -0.32* -0.66*** -0.54* -1.09** 
  (0.420) (0.183) (0.330) (0.598) (0.162) (0.131) (0.193) (0.205) (0.304) (0.459) 
SB*interbank rate           -0.11*  -0.10  
            (0.055)  (0.091)  
SB*low interest rates             0.24*  0.54 
             (0.135)  (0.338) 
Interbank rate -0.54 0.39*** 0.56*** -0.32 0.28*** 0.35*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.58*** 0.56*** 
  (0.628) (0.104) (0.147) (0.675) (0.049) (0.034) (0.104) (0.103) (0.152) (0.149) 
Low interest rates            -1.90***  0.90 
             (0.380)  (0.951) 
Constant 2.92 3.14*** 1.02 6.59 3.53*** 2.14*** 3.11*** 3.19*** 0.93 1.06 
  (1.953) (0.726) (1.656) (4.264) (0.647) (0.530) (0.728) (0.725) (1.627) (1.597) 
Other bank & macro var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (#) 118 1,168 459 78 787 785 1,168 1,168 459 459 
Banks (#) 118 125 74 78  83 83 125 125 74 74 
R2 0.32  0.51 0.55  0.38 0.79  0.76  0.51  0.51  0.56  0.56  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns (1) and (4): Heteroscedasticity-robust OLS estimation. Other columns: Random-effect GLS estimation with standard errors 
clustered at the bank level (in parentheses).  
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Table B5. Alternative Interaction: Market Concentration  
Dependent variable Interest rates on loans Interest rates on all deposits 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Social bank (SB) -1.34*** -1.16* -0.31** -0.15 
  (0.455) (0.649) (0.127) (0.141) 
SB*market concentration  -3.11  -1.75*** 
   (2.728)  (0.632) 
Market concentration  5.47 5.95 1.17** 1.44** 
  (3.615) (3.936) (0.549) (0.581) 
Constant 13.41*** 13.30*** 3.02*** 2.91*** 
  (2.221) (2.278) (0.660) (0.662) 
All other control var. Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations (#) 836 836 1,109 1,109 
Banks (#) 111 111 124 124 
R2 0.43 0.42 0.71 0.72 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Random-effect GLS estimation with standard errors clustered at the bank 
level (in parentheses).  
 
 
 
 
Table B6: Selection on Unobservable Variables   
Dependent variable 
 
ROA Interest rate on loans Interest rate on liabilities 
Uncontrolled  Controlled Uncontrolled  Controlled Uncontrolled  Controlled 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Social bank coefficient -0.291 -0.244 -1.444 -1.605 -0.473 -0.436 
R-squared 0.018 0.281 0.036 0.431 0.025 0.713 
𝛽𝛽�1
∗ (𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚 = 1 and 𝛿𝛿 = 1)   -0.125  -1.835  -0.421 
𝛽𝛽�1
∗ (𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚 = 1.3 and 𝛿𝛿 = 1)  -0.067  -1.957  -0.405 
Note: This table is based on the specifications displayed in Table 4.   
 
 
 
